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Does Price of an Essential Non-Renewable Resource Necessarily Grow? 
 
 
Đ. Hakan Yetkiner 
 




Dasgupta and Heal’s 1974 paper extends Hotelling’s 1931 partial equilibrium 
model  into  a  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model.  Both  papers  show  that 
nonrenewable  resource  prices  do  grow  exponentially,  which  is  called  the 
Hotelling’s rule in the literature. Empirical evidence on the contrary shows that 
most nonrenewable prices are constant in the long-run. The controversy between 
theory and empirical regulatory perhaps may be called the Hotelling’s Paradox. 
This  paper,  based  on  Dasgupta  and  Heal  (1974),  shows  that  nonrenewable 
dependent  growth  does  not  always  generate  skyrocketing  resource  prices.  In 
particular, this paper shows that resource price converges to a constant under 
Cobb-Douglas  technology  and  that  the  model  economy  dies  out  under  a 
particular value of elasticity of marginal utility. 
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Introduction 
 
In his seminal article, Hotelling (1931) showed that price of a nonrenewable resource must 
grow  at  the  real  interest  rate  at  optimum,  a  result  known  as  the  ‘Hotelling’s  rule’  in 
nonrenewable resource economics.
1 The Hotelling’s rule is in partial equilibrium nature: a 
nonrenewable sector solves the dynamic problem of maximizing discounted profits over an 
infinite horizon, constrained by the initial stock of the nonrenewable. The dynamic profit 
maximization problem yields that the resource price must grow at the (real) rate of interest, 
the discounting factor, when extraction is costless and the market is perfectly competitive. 
Since interest rate is taken constant in a partial equilibrium solution, resource price grows 
infinitely. 
 
Professors P. Dasgupta and G. Heal overcome partial equilibrium nature of the rule by 
publishing their seminal paper “the optimal depletion of exhaustible resources” in 1974. In 
their paper, Dasgupta and Heal (1974), henceforth D-H, integrated a final-good market 
with  a  nonrenewable  resource  market  in  a  Ramsey  setup,  and  analyzed  the  optimal 
depletion  of  nonrenewable  resources.  One  unfortunate  assumption  made  in  their  paper 
however precluded D-H to unveil the distinguishing characteristic of general equilibrium 
version  of  the  rule  from  its  partial  equilibrium  version.  In  particular,  D-H  ignored 
differentiating between the rental rate of capital and the interest rate. This was a critical 
misspecification because a growth setup with a depleting resource as an input in final-good 
production technology has a peculiar characteristic that the time paths of rental rate of 
capital and resource price can be determined by the resource sector’s efficiency condition 
independently from the rest of the model. This happens because resource price and rental 
rate of capital can be expressed in terms of their respective marginal productivities, which 
can be further defined in terms of capital/resource extraction ratio. Hence, mathematically 
speaking, when rental rate of capital and interest rate are assumed to be one and same 
thing, it allows the differential equation derived from resource sector efficiency condition 
grow infinitely in terms of capital/resource extraction ratio (which can be expressed also in 
terms of rental rate of  capital or  resource price). Clearly, the distortion is fed back to 
resource price and rental rate of capital, and hence these results also become distorted. In 
the final analysis, the partial equilibrium version of the Hotelling’s rule is reproduced by 
Dasgupta and Heal (1974). 
 
It has been well documented that the Hotelling’s rule is not supported by the empirical 
regularity.  Looking  at  real  price  behaviors  of  several  nonrenewables  like  aluminum, 
copper, iron ore, lead, silver, and tin prove that there is no apparent trend in rate of growth 
of resource prices in the last century.
2 Given the (existing) theory, the reaction to this 
paradox in the literature has been twofold: (i) incorporating additional elements into the 
partial  equilibrium  model  such  as  exploration  costs,  capital  investment  and  capacity 
constraints,  ore  quality  variations,  (ii)  modifying  econometric  techniques  and/  or  data. 
                                                 
1 A good exposure to this literature can be attained by the following studies. First, Gordon (1967) can be read 
to get a good sense of the pre-Dasgupta and Heal (1974) literature. Smith (1968) can be also useful in that 
respect. Second, Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Stiglitz (1974a, 1974b) must be read as they incorporate a 
nonrenewable resource sector into a growth framework. Third, surveys of Peterson and Fisher (1977) and 
Krautkraemer (1988) can be read for a good exposure to the post-Dasgupta and Heal literature. 
2 Interested readers may find rich data at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/of01-006/ on nonrenewable 
prices. See also e.g., Krautkraemer (1998). International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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Nobody  ever  however,  to  our  knowledge,  has  ever  questioned  the  partial  equilibrium 
nature of the Hotelling (1931) or misspecification in Dasgupta and Heal (1974). 
 
This study presents the true general equilibrium version of the Hotelling’s rule and shows 
that resource prices will converge to a constant under Cobb-Douglas (henceforth, C-D) 
technology.
3 In that respect, this study argues that the paradox between the theory and 
empirics  may  indeed  be  a  fictitious  one.  The  second  contribution  of  this  study  is  the 
advancement towards a full analytical solution of the D-H setup. This study presents the 
complete analytical solution under a specific elasticity of marginal utility assumption. We 
know  that  assigning  a  particular  value  to  elasticity  of  marginal  utility  may  distort  the 
behavior  of  real  economy  (physical  capital,  output,  and  the  nonrenewable  resource). 
Nonetheless, having a complete analytical solution still generates useful information to 
reveal rules for sustainable consumption and growth. 
 
A short summary of the model is as follows. Two factors of production, a reproducible 
capital and a nonrenewable resource, are used to produce a final output, which can be 
consumed or invested. We assume the final-good production technology is C-D, which 
implies that both factors are essential. Our main motivation for relying on C-D technology 
is analytical tractability. Profit-maximizing firms operating in the good market imply a 
unique resource price/rental ratio and a corresponding optimal capital/resource ratio. A 
nonrenewable  resource  extracting  sector  solves  the  dynamic  problem  of  maximizing 
discounted  profits  over  an  infinite  horizon,  constrained  by  the  initial  stock  of  the 
nonrenewable.  The  main  difference  between  D-H  and  our  approach  appears  to  be  our 
differentiation between rental rate of capital and of loans. Our results diverge substantially 
by this single assumption, nonetheless. In particular, we demonstrate that the price of the 
nonrenewable does not grow in the long-run, albeit the resource is essential in production. 
Our explanation to this finding is as follows: Economic agents with perfect foresight in a 
depleting economy recognize that there is no way to sustain consumption and production 
in the long-run, when a depleting resource is essential. In such a case, optimal behavior is 
to  plan  a  smooth  depletion  of  an  economy  instead  of  accepting  rising  prices  of  the 
nonrenewable, just to sustain consumption and production for a while. Hence, contrary to 
what  Hotelling’s  rule  suggests,  it  is  optimal  to  observe  resource  prices  increasing  at 
decreasing  rates  or  decreasing  at  decreasing  rates,  depending  on  the  ratio  of  initial 
extraction to initial capital stock. That is why we observe constant resource price in the 
long-run. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The second section presents the basic model 
and the simulations under a specific elasticity of marginal utility value. We show that the 






                                                 
3 Heuristically speaking, we may argue that similar results would hold for a CES technology with inelastic 
substitution, due to Gaitan, Tol, and Yetkiner (2004), henceforth G-T-Y. Though GTY (2004) is developed 
under exogenous saving assumption, results would not change in the long-run. It must be noted that the 
genuine weakness of such an assumption is that the (critical) role played by the impatience of economic 
agents on depletion and on the rest of the economy is ignored.  International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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The Model 
 
We assume that total consumer utility of a representative consumer consists of the present 
value of an infinitely long stream of consumption of final output, as given by the standard 

















r       0 , > r q         (1) 
 
In equation (1), U  represents total utility,  ) (t C  is the flow of consumption at time t,  r  is 
the subjective rate of discount, and  q / 1  is the elasticity of substitution between flows of 
consumption at different points in time. For simplicity, we assume that the family size of 
the household does not change in time. Households hold assets in the form of ownership 
claims on capital and nonrenewables. Households are competitive in that each takes as 
given the real rental rate of capital  ) (t r  and the real price of nonrenewable resource  ) (t q . 
The flow budget constraint for the household is 
 
( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t C t A t r t R t q A - × - + × = d &             (2) 
 
In (2),  i t r º -d ) (  is the real rate of interest, and  ) (t r  is the rental rate of capital. The 
equation states that assets rise with income  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t A t i t R t q × + ×  and fall with consumption 
) (t C . 
 
The household’s optimization problem is to maximize U  in equation (1), subject to the 
budget  constraint  in  equation  (2),  the  stock  of  initial  assets  0 ) 0 ( A A = ,  and  the 
transversality condition (see below). As the momentary utility function satisfies the Inada 
(1963) condition that the marginal utility of consumption becomes infinite when  0 ) ( ® t C , 
the inequality restriction  0 ) ( ³ t C  does not apply. The present-value Hamiltonian is 
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We omit time subscripts in the subsequent analysis whenever no ambiguity results. The 
variable  m  is the present-value shadow price of income.  It  represents the value of an 
increment  of  income  received  at  time  t  in  units  of  utils  at  time  0.  The  first  order 
conditions for a maximum of U , in addition to (2), are 
 
m
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J & &                 (5) 
 
where  the  transversality  condition  is  0 )] ( ) ( [ lim = × ¥ ® t A t t m .  The  reduced  form  of  the 
canonical system turns out to be 
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under the assumption that total assets  A is equal to total capital stock  K , which must hold 
in a closed economy without government. This completes the household side of the model. 
Let us turn to the production and extraction sides now. 
 
We assume that output  Y  is produced by using physical capital  K  and a nonrenewable 
resource  R . Production technology is represented by 
a a - =
1 R K Y , where a  is production 
elasticity of capital.
4 Notably,  ) (· F  is increasing, strictly concave, twice differentiable, 
and homogenous of degree one. Each input is essential under C-D technology, and the 
Inada conditions guarantee that  0 > K  and  0 > R . Under a perfectly competitive market 
assumption each factor will be paid (in real terms) its marginal contribution to production: 
 
r FK =                      (7a) 
q FR =                     (7b) 
 
In (7),  r  and  q are, respectively, the rental price for a unit of capital services and the 
nonrenewable resource price, and  K F  and  R F  are the marginal productivities of K  and R . 
This constitutes the production side of the economy. Let us now consider the extraction 
sector. 
 
Suppose that the resource market is a perfectly competitive one (hence, prices are given) 
and that extraction is costless. Under these  assumptions, the representative firm would 
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In (8),  i is the (endogenously determined) real interest rate,  0 S  is the initial stock of the 
nonrenewable,  and  d - º r i .  Equation  (8)  is  an  isoperimetric  problem  of  calculus  of 












) ) ( (
Re                 (9) 
                                                 
4  A  relatively  broad  production  function  specification  would  be  a  CES  technology  such  as 
( )
s s s a a
/ 1
) 1 ( R K Y - + = , where  a  is the distribution parameter and  ) 1 /( 1 s e - =  is the elasticity of 
substitution between  K  and  R . Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive an analytical solution under the 
CES specification. Furthermore, we know since G-T-Y (2004) that the case that factors of production are 
complements yields similar results to CD and that the case in which factors of production are substitutes 
yields results analogous to what D-H found. Therefore, exploiting the CD form to derive, to solve, and to 
study the dynamic economic system is sufficient. International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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where  l   is  Lagrange  multiplier  and  constant  by  definition,  and  the  respective 
transversality  condition  is  0 Re lim
0








.  The  solution  of  the  isoperimetric 
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Equation (10) is a non-arbitrage condition saying that the nonrenewable is essentially an 
asset and therefore its (real) price must increase at the real interest rate: 
 
d - = r q q/ &                     (11) 
 
Equation (11) is the well-known Hotelling’s rule in its simplest form.
5 Recall that in partial 
equilibrium  r  is presumed constant, and therefore  q grows at the constant rate  d - r . In 
our model,  r  is determined endogenously. In D-H,  r  is also determined endogenously. 
The difference between our model and their model arises from the fact that interest rate i 
and rental rate of capital  r  are identical in their model, which implies an unconstrained 
growth  on  physical  capital/resource  extraction  rate.  Therefore,  their  results  reproduce 
partial equilibrium result of the Hotelling’s rule. 
 
The solution procedure of the model is as follows. Firstly, from (7), it is straightforward to 
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Using this information in equation (11) leads to the following differential equation: 
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 (obviously, their model does not 
include capital depreciation). International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
 
  137 
Remarkably, the initial value of  q,  ) 0 ( q , provides critical information in determining the 
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then the  ) (t q  path is constant. We remind the reader that the  ) (t q  path approaches infinity 
in D-H due to the fact that their version of (13) does not discriminate between rental rate of 
capital and interest rate (see Annex B for the complete derivation of D-H model). 
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Observe  that  rental  rate  of  capital  converges  to  d =
* r   and  price  of  nonrenewable  to 
) 1 /(











 - = q , irrespective of whether  q approaches its steady state from above or 
below. 
 
Some  comments  are  in  order  due  to  (14).  Firstly,  the  fact  that  nonrenewable  price 
converges to a constant in the model is a substantial divergence from what the Hotelling’s 
rule implies. Secondly, though the price of nonrenewable converges to a constant in the 
steady state, it does not imply that all nonrenewables and all countries (representing closed 
economies)  have  identical  dynamics.  Suppose  that  there  are  two  completely  closed 
countries, owning the same resource but have substantially different  ) 0 ( q  values (which 
are function of elasticity of marginal utility and subjective rate of discount as much as 
technology parameters). In that case, the same resource will show different price dynamics 
in  different  economies.  Thirdly,  elasticity  of  marginal  utility  q   and  subjective  rate  of 
discount  r  have no effect on the time path of  q and  r  (though they have in  ) 0 ( q ,  ) 0 ( r , 
K  and  R ). In other words,  q and  r  are independent of household’s time-patience and 
desire for consumption smoothness preferences, except their initial values. This result is 
due to the fact that the Hotelling’s efficiency condition imposes a solution for  q and  r  
independent from the rest of the model. 
 
The rest of the model can be solved as follows. First, from (6a) 
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where  ) 0 ( c  is a constant. The most interesting characteristic of consumption path is the 
finding that consumption peters out and approaches zero in time, irrespective of parameter 
values and initial value. Secondly, when consumers are very concerned with smoothing 
consumption over time or are very patient, the fall in consumption slows down. Finally, the 
fact  that  consumption  peters  out  in  time  implies  that  utility  is  bounded  from  above 
irrespective of parameter-value assumptions.
6 
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A first step in solving (17) is to note that it is a linear first-order differential equation.
8 
Hence,  multiplying  both  sides  of  (18)  by  the  integrating  factor 
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In (18),  2 c  is a constant that comes out from integration. We will drop it from the equation 
as its value must be zero for satisfying the transversality condition. To our knowledge, it is 
not possible to solve the integration problem on the RHS of (18), unless a specific value 
for q  is assumed. It should be noted that a restriction on q  may change time behavior of 







  in  (18).  By  this  assumption,  we  force  q   to  be  1 0 < < < a q   and  that  the 
household does not have a strong preference for a smooth consumption pattern. Hence, a 
simulation  of  consumption  path  would  show  a  hump-shaped  pattern  with  a  very  steep 
decay towards zero.  
 
Under the specific  q  assumption, the power of the first term in the integrand becomes 
unity and hence solution becomes possible. In particular, we find the capital path as 
 
                                                 
6 Checking for bounded utility is not algebraically straightforward. By intuition, nevertheless, we know that 
utility is bounded from above because consumption is declining in time. This result can be more clearly seen 
for, say,  ) 2 /( a a q - =  assumption. 
7 Use equation (7a) to see this. 
8 See Annex A for the derivations. International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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)) 0 ( (q b .  Notably,  capital  stock 
converges to zero at the limit,  0 ) ( lim = ¥ ® t K t . The faster the petering out of capital stock, 
the more impatient the consumers are. 
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Obviously,  nonrenewable  resource  depletes  smoothly  towards  zero  in  time.  Again,  the 
petering out of nonrenewable is faster, the more impatient the consumers. Notably, the 
transversality  condition  of  problem  (9),  0 Re lim
0








,  is  satisfied.  Finally, 




0 0 ) ( dt t R S , for  0 ) 0 ( K K =  (see Annex A). Hence, we derive the complete analytical 
solution. 
 
The utmost important finding of our derivations is that resource price  q is constant in the 
long run under a C-D production technology. Mathematically speaking, this is due to the 
fact  real  rate  of  interest  d - r   is  approaching  zero  at  the  steady  state.  Economically 
speaking, this result is due to the fact that economic agents with perfect foresight find a 
smooth depletion of resource and economy optimal. This is in sharp contradiction with the 
prediction of partial Hotelling’s rule that an economy will “resist” depletion by offering 





Equations (6a), (6b), and (11) form the canonical system in the model. Equation (11) can 
be solved separately.  It  directly implies a solution for (6a). Consequently, (6b)  can be 
solved.  Hence,  the  stability  of  the  canonical  system  is  indeed  defined  by  (11).  It  is 
straightforward to check the stability of (11) and show that it is indeed stable. 
 International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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Monopoly 
 
An alternative market structure assumption in the resource market is monopoly. In our 
model,  a  monopolist  who  owns  the  only  deposit  takes  into  account  the  relationship 
between q and  R , so that the necessary condition in (10) becomes marginal revenue equal 
to marginal user cost. Hence, marginal revenue (and not price) will rise at the rate of 
interest (in case of zero extraction costs). But this in itself does not tell us whether the 
resource  will  be  extracted  more  or  less  rapidly  than  by  competitive  producers.  Some, 
following Hotelling (1931, p.153), might assume that the rate of resource extraction is 
reduced because of “the general tendency for production to be retarded under monopoly”. 
However, as Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1975), Sweeney (1977), Stiglitz (1976), and Kay 
and Mirrlees (1975) discussed and showed, the deviation in the extraction behavior of 
monopolist with respect to the perfectly competitive case depends on the price elasticity of 
demand. In particular, under the constant elasticity demand schedules, with zero extraction 
costs, monopoly prices and competitive equilibrium prices will in fact be identical, and 
hence the rate of utilization of the resource. Since our analytical model exploits a Cobb-
Douglas technology, it implies a constant elasticity demand and therefore monopoly and 
perfectly competitive cases are identical.  
 
A Tabular Summary of Results 
 
We present at Annex B the full solution of D-H. A comparison of results is as follows: 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Steady-states  




r   0  δ 
q  ∞  (1-α)(α/δ)
α/(1-α) 
K   0  0 
R   0  0 
C   0  0 
R K / = c   ∞  (α/δ)
1/(1-α) 
 
As Annex B and Table 1 reveals, the D-H assumption that rental rate of capital and interest 
rate are equal forces capital-extraction ratio  c  to grow infinitely. Since  r  and q (and C ) 
are solely function of  c , it also results in distorted factor prices in the model. Our market 
solution of the same problem shows that indeed resource price converges to a constant in 
the long-run. When we consider technology in the model, we find that the model-economy 




In this subsection, we will compare the three solutions via simulations. The advantage of 
this approach to the tabular summary is the fact that we fully exploit the power having 
complete analytical solution by also comparing transitional dynamics of the three cases. 
Let  us  assume  that  5 . 0 = a ,  1000 0 = K ,  1000 0 = S ,  1 . 0 = d ,  02 . 0 = r , 
6 . 0 ) 2 /( = - = a a q . It must be noted that we need to take up high values of  0 K  due to the 
fact that the economy is depleting. Other parameter-value assumptions are quite common International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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in the literature. The initial step on simulations is to determine  ) 0 ( C  and  ) 0 ( R . In the 
Appendix, we indicate how they are calculated. 
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Figure 1d: Time path of capital 
 
 




The  clear  impact  of  the  true  formulation  of  the  Hotelling’s  Equation  is  seen  on  the 
behavior  of  resource  price,  when  we  compare  D-H  and  our  results.  We  observe  that 
resource price is indeed converging to a constant in the long-run, contrary to what D-H 
suggests. A second observation about the difference between D-H and our results is that D-
H model show non-smooth (hump-shaped) behavior in consumption, capital and resource 
depletion, which we believe is due to the fact that the model is forced to offer rising prices 




In  this  paper  we  studied  the  growth  impact  of  a  nonrenewable  resource  in  a  Ramsey 
framework. Our study is inspired very much by the seminal paper of Dasgupta and Heal 
(1974). The main difference between our model and their model is that we differentiate 
between rental rate of capital and interest rate in the model. The distinguishing property of 
a growth model with an essential depleting resource in production is that resource price, 
rental rate of capital and consumption are determined independently from the rest of the 
model.  Since,  Dasgupta  and  Heal’s  approach  forces  capital  extraction  ratio  to  grow 
infinitely,  the  approach  also  distorts  the  input  price  movements  and  reproduces  partial 
equilibrium Hotelling’s rule. Our approach on the other hand showed that the price of the 
nonrenewable  converges  to  a  constant  in  the  long  run  under  the  Cobb  Douglas  case. 
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Indeed, we find this result quite intuitive under the perfect foresight assumption. If an 
economy has to decline sooner or later, why economic agents has to prefer to pay higher 
and higher prices for a depleting resource just to sustain consumption and production a bit 
higher for a while. Quite the reverse, rational agents would design a smooth contraction 
path and prefer to a pay a constant price to resource in the steady state. International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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Annex A 
 
Recall that equation (19) is  
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The two unknowns in (A.2) are  ) 0 ( q  and  ) 0 ( C . The second equation for solving these two 
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Annex B 
 
The Dasgupta and Heal (1974) model implies the following results for  R K / = c ,  r ,  q, 
and C : 
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t r                 (B.2) 
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t P . The solution 




) ( u t , where  ) )) 0 ( ( ) 1 ((
1 a c a
- + - = t u . Next, multiply 
both sides of (B.5) by the integrating factor  ) (t p , which allows one to re-formulate the 
problem as follows: 
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It is not possible to solve the integration in (B.6) analytically, unless a specific value is 







. Then, K  is found as: 
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Transversality condition that  0 )] ( ) ( [ lim = × ¥ ® t K t t m  implies that  2 c  must be zero. Hence, 
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t c           (B.7`) 
 
Notably, the term in the parenthesis on the right hand side can be negative for low values 
of t and  ) 0 ( c . Therefore, we need to assume that  ( ) 0 )) 0 ( ( 1 ) 1 (
1 > + - -
-a c a t . Given the 
fact that this economy is depleting over time,  1 ) 0 ( > c  is not a strong assumption. The International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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value of  R  can be found by using profit maximizing factor employment conditions of  K  
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t c           (B.8) 
 
Finally, from the resource constraint, we find that 
 
( ) ) 1 )) 0 ( (( ) 1 ) / )(( 1 ( ) / (
1 2
0
1 - + - - =
-a c r q a r q
c e S          (B.9) 
 
Equations (B.7`) and (B.9) determine values of  ) 0 ( R  and  ) 0 ( C . Hence, full solution is 
found. 
 